The Violinist
Judith Jarvis Thompson's
Violinist
Analogy
Judith Jarvis Thomson’s violinist analogy appears in her seminal 1971 essay, A Defense of Abortion. Her goal is to challenge the pro-life assumption that the fetus’s right to life necessarily outweighs a woman’s right to bodily autonomy.
The Scenario: Imagine you wake up connected by tubes to a famous unconscious violinist. This violinist has a fatal kidney condition, and the Society of Music Lovers has kidnapped you because only your body can keep him alive. If you stay connected for 9 months, the violinist will recover. You didn’t consent to this, but if you unplug him now, he will die. Are you morally obligated to stay connected?
Thomson argues that just as you’re not morally obligated to remain hooked up to the violinist, a woman isn’t morally obligated to continue a pregnancy—even if the fetus has a right to life—because bodily autonomy trumps that obligation.
Analysis of Thomson’s Argument
Thomson grants, for the sake of argument, that the fetus is a person from conception with a right to life. However, she argues that the right to life does not entail the right to use another person’s body to sustain life. Just as the violinist has no right to your kidneys, even if his life depends on them, so the fetus has no right to the mother's womb without her continuous consent.
This distinction separates:
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The right to life (not to be killed unjustly)
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The right to use someone else’s body (which may not follow from the right to life)
Implications
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The analogy shifts the debate from what the fetus is (personhood) to what rights the fetus has in relation to the pregnant woman.
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Thomson introduces the concept of "minimally decent Samaritanism": while it might be generous or admirable to carry a pregnancy to term, morality may not require it, particularly in cases like rape.
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She explores consent and bodily autonomy, suggesting that pregnancy—even if life-saving—cannot override a woman’s bodily rights.
Pro-Life Refutation
Disanalogy Between Pregnancy and the Violinist Scenario
While Thomson’s analogy is rhetorically powerful, pro-life philosophers argue that it fails to mirror the morally relevant aspects of pregnancy:
Parental Obligation and Special Responsibility
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Parents have a natural duty to care for their offspring, even when burdensome.
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Just as a parent cannot walk away from a drowning child or abandon an infant, they cannot morally abandon the fetus either
"Unlike the violinist, a mother has a unique, special obligation to her child precisely because of the parental relationship and the consequences of actions taken that lead to its creation." (Kaczor, The Ethics of Abortion, 2010, p. 140)
Consent to Sex vs. Consent to Pregnancy
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Even in non-rape cases, critics argue that by engaging in sex, the woman has accepted the foreseeable consequence of pregnancy, which entails responsibility—even if contraception was used.
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You may not consent to pregnancy, but consenting to the act that can reasonably result in it carries a degree of moral responsibility.
"If you open the door and invite someone in, you have some responsibility for their presence. Similarly, by choosing sex, one accepts responsibility for any resulting human life." (Beckwith, Defending Life, p. 172)
Natural vs. Artificial Dependency
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Pregnancy is a natural biological relationship, not a medically contrived scenario.
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The fetus is where it naturally belongs; the violinist is a stranger artificially connected to someone’s body.
"The violinist case is an example of artificial, non-natural dependency. Pregnancy involves a natural relationship where the mother is already biologically ordered toward the child’s support." (Beckwith, Defending Life, 2007, p. 171)
The Right to Life vs. Killing vs. Letting Die
Thomson's claim that abortion is like letting die rather than killing is also challenged:
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In abortion, the fetus is actively killed (e.g., via dismemberment or chemicals), not merely disconnected and left to die.
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This is morally distinct from passively letting someone die (as in the violinist analogy).
"To ‘detach’ a fetus is to kill it, whereas detaching a violinist might allow natural death. This moral difference matters." (Patrick Lee and Robert George, Body-Self Dualism in Contemporary Ethics and Politics, 2008, p. 196)
Emotional and Moral Intuition
Many people find it intuitively appalling to forcibly remain plugged into a violinist, but this intuition may not apply to carrying one’s own child, particularly when the child’s existence depends on the parent. The emotional force of the violinist case works best in cases of rape. But pro-life critics note that:
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Less than 1% of abortions are due to rape.
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The analogy should not dictate laws or moral norms for the remaining 99%.
Conclusion
Thomson's violinist analogy provides a provocative reframing of the abortion debate—shifting it from fetal personhood to bodily rights. However, pro-life thinkers argue that the analogy breaks down when considering:
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The special parental duties that arise from that relationship,
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The moral significance of actively killing versus passively letting die. and
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The natural biological relationship of mother and child.
While bodily autonomy is crucial, it does not necessarily override the duty not to kill innocent human beings, particularly one’s own offspring.
Citations
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Beckwith, Francis J. Defending Life: A Moral and Legal Case Against Abortion Choice. Cambridge University Press, 2007.
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Kaczor, Christopher. The Ethics of Abortion: Women’s Rights, Human Life, and the Question of Justice. Routledge, 2010.
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Lee, Patrick and George, Robert P. Body-Self Dualism in Contemporary Ethics and Politics. Cambridge University Press, 2008.